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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Rien n’est possible sans les hommes,
rien n’est durable sans les institutions”1
Europa, a Phoenician princess kidnapped by the Greek god Zeus in the form of a bull,2
gave her name to the European continent.3

This continent has been the battlefield of all

European states in their conquest for power and territory, but it has also been the birthplace of
the most unique political project ever, called the European Union.
The European project started as an economic project, but from the beginning the drafters
of this project intended it to evolve into a political project, what it eventually did. Today, the
European Union is much more than a customs union; the European Union has become an
important actor on the international stage. Nevertheless, important differences remain between
the external trade policy of the European Community and the Common Foreign and Security
Policy of the European Union, the latter being the main topic of this thesis, although both will be
examined. The power of the European Union – when it acts as a unity – became clear in the
World Trade Organization. Although all of the Member States are members, the European
Communities, represented by the European Commission, speaks for all the Member States at
nearly every meeting.4 The same power cannot yet be seen in the Common Foreign and Security

1

JEAN MONNET cited in Giovanni Grevi, The Convention on the Future of Europe, EPC WORKING PAPERS (2003),
available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth140403_2_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
2
WWW.IN2GREECE.COM, EUROPA, available at
http://www.in2greece.com/english/historymyth/mythology/names/europa.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
3
According to Herodotus , Europa was abducted by the Greek in order to revenge the abduction of the Greek
princess Io by the Phoenicians, see id.
4
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
1

Policy. The inability of the European Union to reach a single European position during the 2003
Iraq crisis clearly indicated the lack of a “common” foreign policy.5
At present, the European Union faces a crucial moment in its existence: the coming
enlargement together with the necessary institutional reforms. The final European treaty, the
Treaty of Nice, had not prepared the Union sufficiently on this event. It is the intention of the
Draft Constitution to accomplish where the Treaty of Nice had failed, but also to rethink the
whole institutional framework of the European Community6 and European Union. The evolution
in the European integration process can be compared with the American process. Between 1776
and 1786 the United States were a confederation, a political organization that carries a lot of
similarities with the current European political organization.

These similarities will be

examined, but also the evolution towards a stronger political unity that has taken place in the
United States and that is taking place in the European Union, but focused on the institutional
framework for the conduct of foreign policy.
The first part of the thesis (Chapter 2) will examine briefly the institutional framework
for the conduct of foreign affairs in the United States. The second part (Chapter 3) will contain
an analysis of the institutional framework of the European Union for the conduct of foreign
policy. The third part of the thesis (Chapter 4) will be the conclusion based on a comparison
between the United States and the European Union.
This thesis will use the Draft Constitution as proposed by the European Convention for
its analysis of the last developments in the institutional framework of the European Union, but
the reader has to be aware that the heads of state and government of the Member States are still
5

Yvonne Campbell, The Presidency of the European Union – An Irish Perspective, INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS 11 (2003), available at http://www.iiea.com/futeuro/wp_pres.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
6
Only the European Community has institutions; the European Union uses the institutions of the Community. When
the Draft Constitution will come in force, the European Union will have its own institutions.
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able to change the proposals of the European Convention on the next Intergovernmental
Conference, which will take place in June 2004.

3

CHAPTER 2
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
The first part of this chapter will deal with the institutional framework for the conduct of
foreign policy under the Articles of Confederation where the United States had a confederate
institutional model. Then, the second part will examine the experience in foreign policy making
under the current Constitution of the United States; this part will be subdivided in a part on the
President, a part on the Congress and a final part on the Supreme Court.

A. Foreign Affairs during the Time of the Articles of Confederation
The thirteen colonies united against the British Government, which had imposed
oppressive measurements on the colonies.7

The colonies also did not look to Parliament

anymore as the defender of their rights8 and understood that only as a union could they oppose
the Empire to secure their rights and liberties.9 Their allegiance to England ended with the
adoption of the Declaration of Independence, where it was declared that:
[T]hese United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, [free and independent States that]
have full power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances […] and to do all other
Acts and Things which [independent States] may of right do.10

7

JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, THE UNITED STATES AS A NATION – LECTURES ON THE CENTENNIAL OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE GIVEN AT BERLIN, DRESDEN, FLORENCE, PARIS AND LONDON 3 (Boston, James R. Osgood and
Company 1877).
8
Arthur R. Landever, Those Indispensable Articles of Confederation – Stage in Constitutionalism, Passage for the
Framers, and Clue to the Nature of the Constitution, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 79, 93 (1989).
9
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 145 (Boston, Little, Brown, and
Company, 5th ed., vol. 1, 1891).
10
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 7 (U.S. 1776).
4

That the former colonies were transformed into thirteen independent states was
reaffirmed in the Articles of Confederation,11 which were ratified by the state legislatures, not by
the people of the states.12
The United States became a confederation,13 where the major power was situated with the
states.14

Institutionally, there was a Congress, which was the legislative branch in the

Confederation, consisting of one chamber and a committee made of a delegation of each state
that would act when Congress was not assembled.15

The separate states retained their

sovereignty, freedom and independence, which were not expressly delegated to the central
government.16 Congress had only few enumerated powers17 and it depended on the states for the
implementation of its decisions.18

Although the Confederation Congress perceived the

enumerated powers broadly,19 there was no theory of implied powers under the Articles of
Confederation.20 After their experience under the British Crown, the states did not want to create
strong central government.21 Nevertheless, the Articles of Confederation restricted the power of
the states in the field of foreign affairs. Although during the Revolution some states proclaimed

11

Story does not agree with the fact that the former colonies became thirteen independent Nations. According to his
view the United States of America had an own territory, an own people, an own Government and an exclusive
sovereignty. From the moment the colonies created a union the Nation existed; see THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 411.
12
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 20, at 193 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1875).
13
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. I; for a thorough comparative study of the Articles of Confederation and the
U.S. Constitution, see Douglas G. Smith, An analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation and
the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249 (1997).
14
MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 109 (1940).
15
JACK W. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 10 (7th ed. 1976).
16
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II, which stated: “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled.”
17
JAMES PARKER HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1910).
18
Landever, supra note 8, at 90.
19
Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the
Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 529 (1925).
20
HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 58 (1915).
21
SAMUEL A. PLEASANTS III, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 23-24 (1968).
5

in their constitutions the sovereign right to conduct foreign affairs and to use military action,22
the Articles of Confederation declared that:
No State [shall] without consent of the United States, in Congress assembled […] send
any embassy to, or receive, any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement,
alliance or treaty with any king, prince, or state.23
The Articles of Confederation also stated that:
No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States, in Congress
assembled.24
The United States was also given exclusive and sole power in matters concerning war and
peace,25 in sending and receiving ambassadors and in treaty and alliance making.26 The states
could not impose duties or imposts, which could interfere with, any stipulations in treaties
entered into by the United States in Congress assembled;27 however the Confederation Congress
could never enter into a treaty unless nine states of the 13 assented.28

22

CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN AFFAIRS – CASES AND MATERIALS 161 (2003).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, cl. 1.
24
Id. art. VI, cl. 5.
25
With exception of the issues mentioned in id. art. VI.
26
Id. art. IX, cl. 1, which stated: “The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right
and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article -- of sending and
receiving ambassadors -- entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made
whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on
foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of
goods or commodities whatsoever -- of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water
shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be
divided or appropriated -- of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace -- appointing courts for the
trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally
appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said
courts.”
27
Id. art. VI, cl. 3, which stated: “No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations
in treaties, entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any King, Prince or State, in pursuance of
any treaties already proposed by Congress, to the courts of France and Spain.”
28
Id. art. IX, cl. 6, which stated: “The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant
letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate
the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States, or
any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree
upon the number of vessels of war, to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor
appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same: nor shall a question on any
other point, except for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless by the votes of the majority of the United
States in Congress assembled.”
23
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The Congress had the power to appoint one of its members to preside, but this President
could not be allowed to serve in that office for more than one year in any term of three years.29
The only task of this President was to preside and he did not have any powers in the conduct of
foreign policy. The President of Congress did not have executive powers.30
Despite the creation by Congress of a Department of Foreign Affairs and a War
Department,31 the Confederation did not have a strong foreign policy.32 According to Louis
Fischer, external sovereignty did not pass from the British Crown to the United States, but to the
states.33 That opinion has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court, which has stated
that the international powers passed from Great Britain to the United States as an entity and not
the individual states.34
The Articles of Confederation explicitly forbade the states to make treaties without the
consent of the Congress,35 but the Articles of Confederation did not state that treaties entered into
by the United States assembled in Congress would have binding force in the states36 and there
was surely no Supremacy Clause in the Articles of Confederation, thus making it very difficult
for the Confederation to uphold a strong position in international negotiations.37
The major political problem under the Articles of Confederation was that Congress
depended on the states for the execution of its powers and despite the obligation for the states to

29

Id. art. IX, cl. 5.
See PLEASANTS, supra note 21, at 25; THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
available at http://www.usconstitution.net/articles.html#Article2 (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
31
PLEASANTS, supra note 21, at 24.
32
FORREST MCDONALD & ELLEN SHAPIRO MCDONALD, CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 1781-1789 61
(1968).
33
LOUIS FISCHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 320 (2nd ed. 1995).
34
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
35
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, cl. 1.
36
Thomas Healy, Is Missouri v. Holland still good law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1726, 1728 (1998).
37
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1643.
30
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abide by the decisions of Congress,38 there was no mechanism to force the states to honor and
follow the decisions made by the Confederation.

Although the Confederation had important

powers, it had no mechanism to implement them by itself.39 The Confederation was in a weak
position in its dealing with other nations,40 thus in its conducting of foreign policy. Even more,
when the Confederation entered into a treaty with a foreign nation, the states of the
Confederation could not be obliged to respect the treaty.41
In the absence of certain supreme powers invested in the Confederation to deal with
issues of general concern, the country could never become a real political union.42

A

confederation is always composed of sovereign and equal constitutive entities43 and its power to
govern does not derive from the people itself.44 The composition of the legislative body of the
confederation showed this very clearly: each state appointed annually delegates for Congress, in
such a manner as the legislature of each state directed45 and the delegates were remunerated by
the states.46

At any time, the state could recall its delegates and send others to fulfill their

term.47 No state was represented in Confederation Congress by less than two, nor more than
seven members.48 Not the people, but the states were parties in the compact under the Articles of
38

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII.
STORY, supra note 9, at 175-176.
40
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1875).
41
STORY, supra note 9, at 175.
42
Id. at 182.
43
THE FEDERALIST NO. 20, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1875).
44
Id. at 176-177.
45
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 1, which stated: “For the most convenient management of the general
interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State
shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each
State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the
remainder of the year.”
46
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE, supra note 30, available at http://www.usconstitution.net/articles.html#Article2
(last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
47
Id.
48
Id. art. V, cl. 2, which stated: “No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor more than seven
members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor
shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another
for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind.”
39

8

Confederation;49 thus no sovereignty derived from the people. The fact that the powers of the
confederation do not derive from the people could be seen as the principal weakness of the
confederate model, which was not able to put forth its supremacy over the states.50 The states
would have remained more powerful than the national government, because their sovereignty
and independence was explicitly stated51 and the Articles of Confederation could not be amended
without unanimous approval of all the state legislatures.52

B. Experience under the Constitution
1. The Presidential Powers in Conducting Foreign Policy
The Constitution of the United States of America gave the institutions of the federation
much stronger foreign affairs power than under the Articles of Confederation.

A strong

executive branch embodied by the President was created together with a federal Supreme
Court.53 The political authority of the federal government was stated to be derived from the
states and the people. The system of government could no longer be seen as a mere compact
between the states; the federal government was responsible to the people directly.54 This would
transform the United States into a great republic,55 the powers of which would derive from the
people and the states.56

49

Smith, supra note 13, at 316.
Id. at 254.
51
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II, which stated: “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled.”
52
Id. art. XIII, cl. 1, which stated: “Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress
assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this
Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration
at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States,
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”
53
Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 1645.
54
Smith, supra note 13, at 292-293.
55
3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 31-32 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
56
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 301-308 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1875).
50
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The Constitution does not give Congress or the President primacy in foreign relations;57
the Constitution just does not talk about general foreign affairs powers.58 Numerous powers in
the field of foreign affairs are conferred on Congress,59 but it is the President who is in charge of
the external relations of the United States.60 The relation between these two institutions could be
defined as a “magnificent ambiguity”61, “often cryptic […] and incomplete”62 and “a struggle for
the privilege of directing American foreign policy”.63

Nevertheless, the Framers of the

Constitution were convinced that concentration of power had to be avoided.64
In international relations, the President of the United States has the primary authority,65 a
principle that is commonly accepted.66 He is solely responsible for the diplomatic and foreign
relations.67 Even Members of Congress recognize that on certain occasions, it is necessary to
talk with a single voice in the international community and the institution of the Presidency is
more apt for this function; the President can act quickly and has wider access to intelligence than
Congress.68

57

Robert J. Spitzner, The President, Congress, and the Fulcrum of Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 85, 107 (David Gray Adler and Larry N. George eds. 1996); also see
GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 112 (1989).
58
H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 527, 545 (1999).
59
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 108.
60
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972).
61
William D. Rogers, The Constitution and Foreign Affairs: Two Hundred Years, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 894, 894
(1989).
62
ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 2 (1973).
63
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 171 (4th ed. 1957).
64
Elliot L. Richardson, Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 25, 25 (Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon and William D. Rogers eds. 1990).
65
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319; also see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 643-644 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 45 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
66
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-294 (1981), where the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government has the
right to protect foreign policy; Saie v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993); First National City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972); also see LOUIS FISCHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN
FRIENDS 192 (1978).
67
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
68
Philip R. Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 752-753 (1989).
10

The powers of the President in foreign affairs can, amongst others, be found in the
Constitution:
“He shall have the power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties.”69
Note that it does not follow from the text of the Constitution that the President on the one
hand negotiates the treaties and the Senate on the other hand approves.70
The Supreme Court has decided that Congress cannot intrude in the power of the
President to negotiate treaties.71 The power to make treaties is an essential part of sovereignty72
and the executive branch is more suitable than the legislative branch to negotiate and make
treaties in the name of the United States.73
The President cannot overrule a decision, such as a refusal to give advice and consent of
the Senate.74 Therefore the executive branch has taken the power to create agreements with
foreign Nations, which do not need to be submitted to the Senate, based on “the independent
constitutional authority”,75 despite the constitutional involvement of the Senate in the treatymaking process.76 In the case of the congressional-executive agreements, Congress has given
permission to the President to negotiate and to make agreements in a specified field. “Sole”
executive agreements are agreements negotiated and made by the President to implement a treaty
or when he deems such agreements appropriate in light of international obligations.77 Although
69

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
See FISCHER, supra note 66, at 194.
71
Curtis-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
72
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 356 (vol. 3, 1970).
73
Id. at 358.
74
ANASTAPLO, supra note 57, at 112.
75
Powell, supra note 58, at 560; Grover Joseph Rees, The Treaty Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 123, 130 (1988-89);
according to the executive the power to make executive agreements flows from the authority of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, his function as representative of the Nation, his duty to execute the laws and to receive
ambassadors, see FISCHER, supra note 66, at 204.
76
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); also see Field v. Clarke, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
77
HENKIN, supra note 60, at 173-176.
70
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these types of executive agreements cannot be an alternative to treaties, which need to be passed
with advice and consent of the Senate,78 sole executive agreements have contributed to the
extension of the President’s power in foreign relations.79
The President has a veto power; before an act of Congress can become law it has to be
approved by him,80 but a two-thirds majority in each of the 2 Houses of Congress can override
the veto of the President.81

Although Congress can override the presidential veto, this

constitutional power of the executive branch is nevertheless a great weapon for defending the
foreign policy as conducted by the executive.82
In general, foreign affairs power of the President is derived from the executive power
vested in him.83 When the President acts in accord with the implicit or explicit will of the
legislature, then the powers of the executive branch are at their zenith,84 while the powers are at
their lowest ebb when the President acts in violation of the implicit or explicit will of Congress.85
The President has to respect the law like any other citizen and he is not the sole authority
in conducting the foreign affairs policy,86 but he is without question the most important

78

Id. at 560-561.
Ernest S. Griffith, The Place of Congress in Foreign Relations, in CONGRESS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 11, 11
(Thorsten V. Kalijarvi and Chester E. Merrow eds. 1953).
80
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 7, cl. 2, which states: “Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall
sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter
the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases
the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against
the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner
as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a
law.”
81
Id.
82
CORWIN, supra note 63, at 223.
83
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252-253 (2001).
84
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 83, at 635.
85
Id. at 637.
86
MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 228 (1977).
79
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institution.87 All foreign affairs powers that are not explicitly given to the Congress belong to
the President; residual powers are thus invested in the executive branch.88

2. The Powers of Congress in Foreign Affairs
Congress was actually intended to have primacy in foreign affairs, although this intention
was never written down in the Constitution,89 but the President took over Congress’ primacy in
the twentieth century.90 Nonetheless, Congress remains having important powers in the conduct
of foreign policy.
Congress has enumerated powers in the area of foreign affairs: it has the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”91, “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”92 and “[t]o declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,93 and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water”.94 Besides these enumerated powers, Congress has others, which are not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution and are acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court.95
The Necessary and Proper Clause entails a very important congressional power;96 the
clause states that Congress will have the power:
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“[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
[…] Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department of Officer thereof”.97
As long as the end is legitimate, Congress can act within the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
even though it is not within the scope of the powers enumerated in the Constitution.98 This
principle is also valid for any legislation that is necessary and proper to implement treaties.99
The Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties, but he needs the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present at the session.100 Congress and the President
are very connected to each other in this area.101 Although the fact that Henkin puts the emphasis
in the Senate’s participation on the authority of the Senate to consent, rather than in the advicegiving function,102 the practice of the executive agreements, where the consent of the Senate is
not required, contradicts his opinion. The consent of the Senate, where all the states have an
equal representation,103 is a very important check over the exercise of the foreign affairs power
by the President104 and the two-third majority was established to ensure, that treaties would not
be made too easily,105 but the President can use executive agreements in order to bypass a
possible rejection by the Senate. The role of the Senate also consists of more than just voting on
a treaty; it can demand reservations and attach conditions.106
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The power of the purse can be seen as an especially important weapon in the hands of
Congress.107 The Constitution stipulates that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law,”108 but Congress cannot exercise this power
without any limits;109 Congress cannot use this power to forbid the President to make treaties,110
a power given to him by the Constitution.111 The Congress has to give the President a certain
amount of freedom and discretion when he is conducting his foreign policy.112 For example,
imagine the impact on the foreign policy of the United States if Congress decides not to give any
more appropriations to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv with the underlying purpose to
relocate the Embassy to Jerusalem to make clear that the future Palestinian State cannot claim
Jerusalem as its capital.
The Framers of the Constitution feared a situation where there would be a “union of the
purse and the sword,”113 which would lead to a foreign policy that is not based on approval by
Congress.114 If Congress does not approve the expenditure necessary for the conduct of a certain
foreign policy, then this policy cannot be implemented.115 This provision was specifically
intended to limit the power of the executive branch,116 which cannot intrude on the exclusive
powers of Congress.117
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3. The United States Supreme Court and Foreign Affairs
The highest federal judicial power is vested in the United States Supreme Court.118 The
United States Constitution states the following:
“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”119
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it cannot review all the acts of the executive
branch.120 Nevertheless, the President must obey the Constitution and the laws, which are the
basis of his power.121
The Supreme Court is not excluded from the resolution of a case because it touches upon
foreign affairs.122 When a judicial settlement can be reached the courts will adjudicate,123 even if
the decision may have significant political consequences.124 The Supreme Court has always
stated that it has the power to exercise judicial review on the implementation of the discretionary
power of the President in foreign affairs.125 Nonetheless, the courts have rarely tried to control
exercises of foreign policy power. Usually they have declined to step in based on the political
question doctrine, ripeness, etc.;126 so, in fact, the judicial role with respect to foreign affairs has
been quite limited.
The decisions of the Supreme Court are very important for the allocation of powers with
respect to foreign affairs. For example, those who defend the President as the sole organ of
117
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foreign affairs will cite from Curtiss-Wright127 to support their argument,128 although different
authors have criticized that decision as being interpreted too broadly.129 The Curtiss-Wright
decision does not provide a sufficient legal basis to support the federal common law on foreign
policy.130 The Supreme Court judgment also does not speak about a “self-executing realm of
exclusive federal foreign affairs power.”131
The judicial branch has played a vital role in obtaining presidential domination in the
field of foreign relations, despite the fear of the Framers for presidential usurpation of foreign
affairs powers.132
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
The first part of this chapter will give a general historical evolution of the European
integration process.

Then, the second part will examine the evolution of the institutional

framework for the conduct of foreign policy of the European Community and European Union.
The third and last part of this chapter will deal with the institutional framework for the conduct
of foreign policy as proposed under the Draft Constitution.
A. Historical Evolution of the European Integration
After the First World War, European leaders increasingly saw the necessity of European
cooperation in order to prevent the outbreak of a next world war and to respond to competition
from Argentina, Japan and the United States.133 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi134 was without
doubt the most important personality to fight for unity on the European continent in the 1920s
through his Pan-European movement.135

In 1930, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs

Aristide Briand submitted a Memorandum136 to 26 European states in which he proposed the
establishment of a European Federal Union.137
Unfortunately, Europe needed another shock in the form of the Second World War before
it started with integration. In 1946 Winston Churchill suggested in his famous speech at the
133

DAMIEN CHALMERS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 5 (vol. 1, 1998).
For a bibliography, see INTERNATIONAL PAN-EUROPEAN UNION, RICHARD N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, available
at http://www.paneuropa.org/ch/html/richard_n__coudenhove-kalergi.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
135
See RICHARD N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, PAN-EUROPE (1926).
136
The Briand Memorandum, see UNIVERSITY OF LEIDEN, THE BRIAND PLAN (1930), available at
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/briand.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
134

18

University of Zurich to create “a kind of United States of Europe”.138 The idea of Churchill led
to the creation of the Council of Europe, which is intergovernmental in nature.139 The strongest
integration came with the creation of the Benelux customs union between Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1948.140
But the real European integration began in 1951 with the creation of the European Coal
and Steel Community,141 which was based on the plan created by the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs Robert Schuman and the French civil servant Jean Monnet.142

The Schuman

Declaration143 was intended to bring an answer on the French fears for an expansion of the
German steel industry after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, which
could harm the French steel industry, because there was already an overproduction of steel in
Europe.144 The Schuman Declaration was unique because the High Authority, composed of
independent persons appointed by the governments on the basis of equal representation and with
a chairman appointed by common agreement between the governments,145 could make decisions
that were binding on the Member States.146

Unlike the Council of Europe, which was

intergovernmental, the European Community for Coal and Steel had a supranational character.
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A further landmark in the European integration was the adoption of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community147 in 1957, on the basis of the Spaak148 Report
of 1956,149 in which decisions concerning the establishment of the common market had a
supranational character, while decisions on other matters, such as on social policy and fiscal
issues, had to be made through an intergovernmental framework.150 The Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community came into force on January 1, 1958, together with the Treaty
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.151 The atomic cooperation was put into a
separate treaty because of fears that the French would reject the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community;152 because France was the only country with a serious atomic energy
plan there was almost absolute certainty that France would not reject the Treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community.

B. The Conduct of Foreign Policy in the European Community and European Union
1. The European Community
a. The Common Commercial Policy
The European Community has legal personality,153 which gives the Community
autonomous external powers.154 That Treaty does not contain a lot of provisions concerning the
foreign affairs powers of the European Community, but the decisions of the Court of Justice of
147
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the European Communities have contributed in defining the scope of the Community’s external
relations powers.155
In the field of the Common Commercial Policy the Treaty establishing the European Community
states the following:
Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be
negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall
authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Council and the
Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements negotiated are
compatible with internal Community policies and rules.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special
committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the
framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The Commission shall report
regularly to the special committee on the progress of negotiations.
The relevant provisions of Article 300 will apply.156
The Common Commercial Policy, which is a matter of exclusive competence of the
Community,157 can be seen as the external part of the single market.158 This is also shown by the
express application of article 300, which deals with the approval of international agreements.159
Agreements in the field of the Common Commercial Policy in accordance with latter article will
be binding on the institutions of the European Community and the Member States.160 Note that
the assent of the European Parliament is only necessary for agreements establishing an
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure;161
for agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing cooperation
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procedures, agreements having important budgetary implications for the Community and
agreements entailing amendment of an act adopted under the co-decision procedure.162

b. External Relations in Other Fields
The Commission maintains relations with the United Nations163 and as appropriate with
all other international organizations.164 The European Community also cooperates with the
Council of Europe165 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.166
The Commission also has 123 delegations around the world accredited to third countries
and at five international organizations in order to represent the European Community abroad.167

2. The European Union towards a Common Foreign and Security
Policy
a. The First Steps
The aim of the Schuman Plan was to create a federation of Europe in the long run.168 The
cooperation in the coal and steel sector would eventually lead to a more general economic union;
the apotheosis of the European cooperation would be the establishment of a political union.169
With the exception of a common coal and steel export strategy to other countries, the Schuman
Declaration did not provide for a common external policy.170
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A real attempt to establish a common foreign and security policy in Western Europe
began after October 1950,171 when the French Prime Minister René Pléven created a plan for a
unified European military structure.172 It was intended that the European Political Community
would incorporate the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense
Community.173 However, on August 30, 1954 the French House of Representatives adjourned
the debate concerning the European Defense Community Treaty,174 which entailed the idea of a
supranational European defense structure.175

In fact, the French House of Representatives

rejected the European Defense Community because of reasons of sovereignty and the fear of a
re-armament of the Federal Republic of Germany; thus, the political pendent of this Community
was also rejected.176 Other objections to the European Defense Community were that it indeed
created a European Army, but without a common foreign and security policy and the lack of
democratic control.177
In August 1950, Winston Churchill also launched an idea of a European military
cooperation, and he even supported the idea of a European Minister of Defense, although
according to him Great Britain would not become a part of this structure.178
In 1961 the French President Charles de Gaulle wanted to eliminate the supranational
characteristics of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and transform it
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into a framework for mere intergovernmental cooperation.179 For this de Gaulle established the
Fouchet Committee, named after the French diplomat Christian Fouchet, which made proposals
to establish a common foreign and security policy. This Committee was established to discuss
the proposal of the French President. The latter proposed the establishment of a Political Union
in which the heads of state and government within the Council of the Union could decide on a
common foreign and security policy by unanimity. Besides a Council of the Union, this Political
Union would also have consisted of a Political Commission to prepare and implement the
decisions of the Council, and a Parliamentary Assembly with advisory powers. The original plan
on this Political Union was to establish it parallel with the European Communities, but later
plans expanded the action radius of the Political Union to economic issues, and the institutions of
the Communities would be bound by the decisions of the heads of state and government.180 The
negotiations on the Fouchet Plan between the Member States did not lead to any action,181
because the small Member States feared a deterioration of the supranational character of the
European Communities, and because of the refusal by the French to let the British participate in
the negotiations.182
In 1969, the heads of state and government meeting at The Hague inaugurated the
European Political Cooperation, which entailed a common foreign policy, in an
intergovernmental manner.183

With the Davignon184 Report that was presented to the

Luxembourg Summit in 1970, the European Political Cooperation was informally launched as
179
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the main consultation device of the European leaders in matters of foreign policy.185 The reason
why the Member States accepted the European Political Cooperation could be found in the fact
that

unlike

in

the

European

Political

Community

the

political

cooperation

was

intergovernmental186 and decisions required unanimity.187
In 1974, the European Council was created. In the European Council the heads of state
and government of the Member States gave incentives for the development of Community law.
In fact, the meeting between the European heads of state and government started in the 1960s to
discuss Community issues.188 The European Council also defined the general orientation of the
common foreign and security policy.189 This organ was the main actor in the European Political
Cooperation.190 The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States could also discuss issues
concerning foreign policy191 and the President of the Council represented the European Council
in the European Political Cooperation.192 The role of the Commission increased193 because it
was involved in the proceedings of the European Council from the beginning and the European
Parliament had the right to be informed.194
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b. Title III of the Single European Act
The Single European Act195 gave a treaty basis to the European Political Cooperation,196
but there remained a legal distinction between the European Community and the European
Political Cooperation.197 Nevertheless, the system of cooperation was given a treaty status.198
The Member States had to endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European
foreign policy;199 there was no obligation to create a common foreign policy, although some
obligations were imposed on the institutions and organs to establish such a policy.200 The
Member States would refrain from impeding the formulation of a consensus as much as
possible.201 Four times a year the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the protagonists in the European
Political Cooperation,202 and a member of the Commission met to discuss foreign policy matters.
They could also discuss foreign policy matters at the meetings of the Council of the European
Communities.203 The Political Committee prepared the meetings of the Ministers and had to
maintain the continuity of the political cooperation.204
The Commission was fully associated with the proceedings of the European Political
Cooperation205 and had the task of controlling the consistency of the policy within the European
Political Cooperation with the foreign policy of the European Economic Community.206
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The European Parliament had the right to be informed, and the Presidency had the duty to
take the views of Parliament in consideration.207
Also the existence of the European Council, which brings together the heads of state and
government of the Member States and the President of the Commission and would meet twice a
year, was recognized in the Single European Act,208 but it was not conceived as a new institution
of the European Communities.209
The task of the Presidency of the European Political Cooperation was to initiate action
and coordinate and represent the Member States to other countries within the framework of the
political cooperation.210 The Member State that was President of the Council was President of
the European Political Cooperation.211
The Single European Act excluded jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities in the field of foreign policy.212
The Member States agreed to reexamine the foreign policy provisions after a period of
five years,213 which led to the adoption of the Treaty on European.

c. The Treaty on European Union
Although the Single European Act only provided for a possible revision of the provisions
concerning the European Political Cooperation, the Member States wanted to have a stronger
global integration214 in a post-Cold War era215 with a historical German reunification216 and
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therefore revised the whole structure of the European political project. Under the Treaty on
European Union217 the European Union was given a pillar structure,218 wherein the first pillar
had a supranational, and the two other pillars an intergovernmental character.219 The Common
Foreign and Security Policy became one of the fundamental pillars of the European Union,220 but
the provisions had an intergovernmental character,221 whose most important feature is that the
Commission does not have the exclusive right of initiative.222 The United Kingdom was very
opposed to a common foreign and security policy that would have been integrated in the
supranational pillar223 but the British Prime Minister agreed with the fact that European
cooperation in matters of foreign policy would be in the best of the country.224 However, the
Treaty on European Union contained more ad hoc compulsory provisions than the Single
European Act,225 because the Member States had to ensure that their national policies were in
conformity with the common positions226 and they had to coordinate their actions and uphold
common positions on the international fora.227 In particular, this means that the Council, acting
unanimously228 or with “quasi-unanimity”229,230 can define common positions.231 For example,
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the Council Common Position on combating the illicit traffic in conflict diamonds, as a
contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts.232 The Council can also decide that a
matter should be the subject of a joint action.233 For example, the Council Joint Action on a
European Union assistance programme to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to
counter terrorist activities emanating from the territories under its control.234 These common
positions and joint actions could entail every aspect of the foreign and security policy because
the Treaty on European Union did not pose any limit on the extent of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.235 Also military aspects could be subject to a common position or joint actions,
which was not the case within the former European Political Cooperation.236 Under the Single
European Act the emphasis remained on unilateral actions by the Member States,237 whilst under
the Treaty on European Union a true common policy was established.238
Because of the intergovernmental character of the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
the Commission did not have a very important role in that policy,239 although it was totally
associated with the work that was done under the second pillar.240 According to the Council this
meant that the Commission had to use Community measures in order to achieve the objectives
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under the Common Foreign and Security Policy,241 but the Commission could also effect the
direction of this policy, because the President of the Commission, assisted by another
Commissioner, was part of the European Council.242 Nonetheless, the Commission was not the
pair of the Member States and was not the one and only executive.243 It was the duty of the
Commission to ensure the consistency and unity between the three pillars in foreign affairs,244
which means that the actions under the second pillar had to be consistent with the actions under
the first pillar, where the Commission is the sole executive.245 The Commission also received a
right of initiative equal to that of the Member States,246 but no “watchdog role”247 was imposed
upon the Commission.
The Presidency became the representative of the European Union in matters relating to
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and would be responsible for the implementation of
the common measures.248

The Presidency would also represent the Union in international

organizations and conferences.249 Although the Commission would be totally associated with
the work of the Presidency,250 the former did not have the same executive power as under the
Treaty establishing the European Community,251 where it enforced and applied Community
law.252 The Presidency will be assisted in its task by the previous Member State that held the
Presidency and the next Member State that will hold the Presidency.253 This troika-structure,
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which includes always 4 members, i.e. the previous Presidency, the current Presidency, the next
Presidency and the Commission, was intended to establish certain continuity in the actions of the
European Union.254 This construction – representation of the Union under the second and third
pillar by the Presidency and by the Commission under the first pillar – did not give the Union a
clear single voice on the international scene, especially concerning mixed-pillar matters.255
The European Parliament continued playing a limited role,256 because it only had the
right to be consulted and to be kept informed,257 and to ask questions and make
recommendations.258 These provisions, however, only meant that the views of the European
Parliament had to be duly taken into consideration259 and not that the consultation of Parliament
became a formal legal procedure before taking a decision under the second pillar.260 In common
foreign and security issues, the European Parliament did not have direct democratic control.261
The Council was responsible for the daily conduct of the common foreign policy under
the guidelines of the European Council and according to the principles defined by the European
Council.262
The Court of Justice of the European Communities had no jurisdiction within the
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Court could neither control the implementation of
the decisions by the Member States nor could it rule on the validity of an action of the European
Union taken in the field of that policy, and no prejudicial questions concerning the common
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foreign policy could be posed to the European Court.263 This meant that a Member State could
not be sued when it failed to abide by a common position; political pressure was the only
enforcement method under the common foreign policy provisions.264 The Confederation under
the Articles of Confederation also depended on the states for the implementation of its decisions
and there was no Supreme Court in which the states could be sued. Questions concerning the
line between the common foreign policy and the Treaties establishing the European
Communities were well within the jurisdiction of the Court265 because the Treaty on European
Union did not affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities.266 The Community
Treaties were thus dominant over the Treaty on European Union,267 which entailed the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union had to respect the acquis communautaire268
and the Court of Justice had the power to impose this duty and sanction any violation of it.269
The European Council, which is not an institution of the European Community,270
defined the principles of and the general guidelines for the common foreign policy271 and
provided guidelines for matters that are subject to joint action.272
Under the Treaty on European Union, the Union had equipped itself with the necessary
structure to create and implement a common foreign policy, but the European Political
Cooperation had already shown that instruments alone were not sufficient if there was no
political will to create a real common policy.273
263
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d. The Treaty of Amsterdam
The Treaty of Amsterdam274 completely rewrote the provisions on the Common Foreign
and Security Policy275 and created a new title for it.276 The Treaty improved the mechanisms –
i.e. the structures and the decision-making process –277 of the Union to act more effectively in
external relations matters,278 without altering the substance and definition of the common foreign
policy,279 although the objective of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the European Union in
conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations was added.280
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Council was given a more important role
in the common foreign policy.281 As under the Treaty on European Union, the European Council
defined – by consensus under the heads of state and government –282 the principles of and the
general guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.283 The European Council was
also assigned the task of deciding on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas
where the Member States have important interests in common.284 These common strategies were
a new foreign policy device created by the Treaty of Amsterdam285 in order to provide for a more
appropriate framework for the decisions on joint actions and common positions made by the
Council than the general guidelines might offer and to introduce an additional veto to safeguard
274
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the national control of foreign policy, because decisions on general guidelines and common
strategies have to be made by consensus.286 This additional safeguard was invented by Germany
to overcome the resistance of France towards the creation of majority voting in the Common
Foreign and Security Policy.287
While the European Council was given the role to define the principles of and guidelines
for the common foreign policy as well as to decide on common strategies, the Council was given
the role to implement these decisions through joint actions and common positions.288 With
respect to joint actions the Treaty of Amsterdam seemed to place the initiative with the Council,
according to Murphy, because in the ad hoc provisions there was no reference to the European
Council.289

Unlike with common strategies,290 the scope, duration, means, objectives and

conditions for the implementation of joint actions were laid down by the Council and not by the
European Council.291 This would mean a shift from the Treaty on European Union where the
European Council provided guidelines for matters that are subject to joint action.292 The special
position of joint actions could be explained by the fact that it is a single institutional act of the
European Union, while common positions required implementation by every Member State;
guidance and coordination by the European Council was thus more required for common
positions.293 But the distinction made by Murphy between joint actions and common positions is
not so convincing, because the Treaty of Amsterdam only referred to the European Council with
286
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regards to common strategies. The Council’s position was thus allegedly reinforced with respect
to joint actions, but in the Treaty on European Union there was never any reference to the
European Council in the provisions concerning common positions.294

Since the Treaty of

Amsterdam a general provision in the Treaty on European Union stated that the Council would
make the necessary decisions to define and implement the Common Foreign and Security Policy
on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.295
The Treaty of Amsterdam took into account the criticism on the Treaty on European
Union and provided more effective procedures in the common foreign policy,296 although the
governments in the European Council continued to decide by unanimity297 or consensus.
Joint actions, common positions, other decisions on the basis of a common strategy and
decisions implementing a joint action or common position were taken by the Council, which
would act by qualified majority.298 Nonetheless, there was a so-called “emergency brake”,299
because if a Member State declared that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it
intended to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote would not
be taken. The Council could, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to
the European Council for decision by unanimity.300 Decisions were thus again taken by “quasiunanimity”,301 as it was under the Single European Act. In matters other than adopting joint
actions, common positions, decisions implementing a joint action or a common position or
taking any other decisions on the basis of a common strategy, the Council would act
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unanimously.302 In order to preserve the balance between unanimity and important national
interest, the procedure of constructive abstention had been introduced.303 Although abstention by
a Member State did not prevent the adoption of a decision in the matters mentioned previously,
every member of the Council could qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration. This
Member State was not obliged to apply the decision, but it had to accept that the decision
committed the European Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State had to refrain
from any action likely to conflict with or impede action of the European Union based on that
decision and the other Member States had to respect the position of the abstaining member of the
Council. But if the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represented
more than one third of the weighted votes, the decision was not adopted.304 Although the
mechanism of abstention opened the possibility of an à la carte common foreign policy, a less
restrictive decision-making procedure was established with the Treaty of Amsterdam,305 but the
efficacy of a decision to which some Member States are not bound could be questioned.306
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Secretary-General of the Council, who was
appointed by the Council,307 became the High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy,308 responsible to assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially through contributing to the formulation,
preparation, and implementation of policy decisions.309 The function of the High Representative
was strongly favored by France, although most other Member States did not favor a new organ
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that would be on the same level as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.310 The function was created
in order to strengthen the administration of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to let it
work more effectively311 and to bring continuity in the foreign relations of the Union.312 At the
request of the Presidency and on behalf of the Council, the High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy conducted the political dialogue with third parties.313

In the

Declaration on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit,314 attached to the
Treaty of Amsterdam, it was mentioned that the High Representative would also lead a new
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit established in the General Secretariat of the Council,315
which would monitor and analyze the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
assess and warn about situations which may affect significantly the latter policy, and publish
policy option papers with recommendations and strategies in this field.316 Although the High
Representative would be the single face and voice of the European Union on the international
forum,317 the Council could still appoint separate special representatives to deal with specific
geopolitical circumstances.318 It was not the intention to transform the High Representative into
a “czar”319 who would conduct the common foreign policy of the European Union,320 especially
because there remained an overlapping with the responsibilities of the Commissioner in charge
310
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of External Relations.321 This also made clear why the existing figure of the Secretary-General
of the Council became High Representative, in order to prevent the creation of a strong political
personage.322
The Commission remained fully associated with the work carried out in the field of the
common foreign policy.323 As under the Treaty on European Union,324 it was fully associated
with the tasks of the Presidency.325 The Commission could ask questions and submit proposals
to the Council326 and request the Presidency to convene an extraordinary Council meeting in a
case of emergency.327 The Council could also request the Commission to submit to it any
appropriate proposals relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy to ensure the
implementation of a joint action.328 Only the latter was an extension of the power of the
Commission,329 so the Commission did not acquire a stronger position in the conduct of the
foreign policy of the European Union.330 The creation of the Policy Planning and Early Warning
Unit in the General Secretariat of the Council also diminished some of the responsibilities of the
Commission.331
The Presidency represented the European Union in matters coming within the Common
Foreign and Security Policy,332 and was responsible for the implementation of the decisions in
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the field of the latter policy. In principle the Presidency expressed the position taken by the
European Union in international organizations and conferences.333 Everything remained as it
was under the Treaty on European Union.334 When the current Presidency saw it fit, it was
assisted by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.335 The troika-structure had been
changed336 and consisted of the current Presidency, the next Member State to hold the
Presidency,337 and the Commission, the latter being a permanent member of the troika.338 Thus,
since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the troika consisted of three members instead of four, as it was
established under the Treaty on European Union.
As before, the European Parliament continued playing a very limited role.

The

Parliament had the right to be consulted by the Presidency on the main aspects and basic choices
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to be kept regularly informed by the Presidency
and the Commission of the development of this policy.339 The Presidency had to ensure that the
views of the European Parliament were duly taken in consideration.340 The Parliament also had
the right to ask questions of the Council or to make recommendations to it and to hold an annual
debate on the progress in the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.341
Although the European Parliament did not have the power to sanction the Council for the
conduct of the Union’s foreign policy,342 the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financing of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy343 provided that the Presidency needed to consult the
333
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European Parliament on a document established by the Council on the main aspects and basis
choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the financial implications on the
budget of the European Communities.344 Each time, when the Council adopted a decision in the
field of the latter policy, the Council had to communicate to the European Parliament an estimate
of the costs envisaged, i.e. a “fiche financière.”345 Also the Commission had to inform the
Parliament on the financial forecasts of the common foreign policy.346
The Treaty of Amsterdam did not change the provisions concerning the competence of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which means that the Court has no
competence in the field of common foreign policy.347
Although the Treaty of Amsterdam did not alter the institutional framework of the
common foreign policy in a significant way,348 the creation of the position of the High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy had an important impact on the
conduct of the Union’s external relations.349 The Treaty of Amsterdam also did not settle the
conflicting relationship between the High Representative and the Commissioner in charge of
External Relations,350 which would remain a substantial problem for several years.

e. The Treaty of Nice
The treaty in force today is the Treaty of Nice,351 which was intended to prepare the
institutions of the European Union on the coming enlargement with twelve more Member
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States.352 The institutions of the European Community had never been reformed since the
creation of this Community and it was clear that a Union with 27 Member States could not work
with an institutional framework created by and for the six Founding Members.353 The Treaty of
Amsterdam had not given sufficient solutions on the problems that would arise due to the
enlargement process.354
The Treaty of Nice did not bring many changes in the field of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. One important factor was the establishment of enhanced cooperation under the
second pillar355 – which had not been introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam –356 in addition to
the existing constructive abstention.357 Enhanced cooperation can only be undertaken as a last
resort, when it has been established within the Council that the objectives of such cooperation
cannot be attained within a reasonable time schedule by applying the relevant provisions of the
Treaties.358 Enhanced cooperation is possible for the implementation of a joint action or a
common position.359 Member States that want to establish enhanced cooperation between them
have to address a request to the Council.360 The request is then forwarded to the Commission
and the European Parliament for information. The Commission has to give its opinion on
whether the proposed enhanced cooperation is consistent with the policies of the European
Union.361 A negative opinion by the Commission will not prevent the enhanced cooperation,
although there were suggestions that the Council should decide on the enhanced cooperation
352
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with unanimity if the Commission had given a negative advice.362 The Council will act by
qualified majority, but if a Member State declares that, for important and stated reasons of
national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision by qualified majority, a vote will
not be taken. Then, the Council can, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be
referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.363 The same “emergency brake”364
as created under the Treaty of Amsterdam is thus applicable on the enhanced cooperation.365
If a Member State wants to participate in enhanced cooperation it has to notify its
intention to the Council and to notify the Commission. Within three months of the date of
receipt of that notification the Commission has to give an opinion to the Council. The Council
will then make a decision within four months of the date of receipt of that notification. The
decision will be deemed to be taken unless the Council, acting by a qualified majority within the
specified periods, decides to hold it in abeyance. If so, the Council can set a deadline for reexamining the request.366 Decisions by the Council are taken by qualified majority.367
The European Parliament plays an insignificant role in the common foreign policy of the
Union.368 It has the right to be informed of the implementation of enhanced cooperation.369 In
the evolution of the institutional framework of the common foreign policy, the European
Parliament never succeeded in taking more power.
Without prejudice to the powers of the Presidency or of the Commission, the High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy has to ensure that the European
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Parliament and all members of the Council are kept fully informed of the implementation of
enhanced cooperation.370
The Political and Security Committee will monitor the international situation in the areas
covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy and has to deliver opinions to the Council
at the request of the latter, or on its own initiative.371 Without prejudice to the responsibility of
the Presidency and the Commission, it must monitor the implementation of agreed policies.372
Under the responsibility of the Council, the Political and Security Committee will exercise
political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and, when authorized by
the Council, the Committee will be able to make ad hoc decisions.373
Thus, the Treaty of Nice brought only minor changes in the institutional framework and
the conduct of the common foreign policy.

C. The Draft Constitution
1. The European Convention
Pursuant to the Declaration on the Future of the European Union374 adopted at the
European Council in Laeken held on December 14-15, 2001, the Convention was established to
pave the path towards the Union’s future development375 and to reform the complex treaty
structure into a less complex one.376 The former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
presided over the Convention, assisted by the former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene
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and the former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato. The Convention consisted of
representatives of the heads of state and government of the current and future Member States,
members of the Commission and national and European parliamentarians; in total 105 members
were represented.377 This Convention, constructed to the model of the American Convention in
1786-1787, completed its work on July 10, 2003,378 and submitted the final text of the Draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe379 to the Italian Presidency of the European
Council in Rome on July 18, 2003.380
The relevant provisions on the Common Foreign and Security policy are now reorganized
in one single constitutional document, which should make this policy area more transparent to
the public and to the international community.381

2. The Draft European Union Constitution
a. The Content of the Draft Constitution in the Areas of
Common Foreign and Security Policy382
The European Union383 will conduct a Common Foreign and Security Policy in which the
European Council – which has been given the status of institution of the European Union –384
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will identify the strategic interests and the objectives385 and define the general guidelines.386 The
composition of the European Council has not changed, except for the fact that the Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs will take part in its work.387 The President of the European Council
will be able to convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council, if international
developments so require, in order to define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy in the face of
such international developments.388 The role of the European Council was thus reinforced as the
essential institution in the common foreign policy.389
The President of the European Council – elected by the European Council by qualified
majority for a term of two and a half years –390 will, at his level and within that capacity, ensure
the external representation of the Union on issues concerning common foreign policy, without
prejudice to the responsibilities of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.391 The President of
the European Council may not hold a national mandate.392 In the Working Group on External
Action it became clear that some Member States opposed the creation of a permanent – and
stronger – President of the European Council.393 The smaller Member States especially feared
that a strong President of the European Council would reduce the protection they received from a
stronger Commission; one of the main tasks of the Commission is to protect the interests of the
smaller Member States.
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The Council of Ministers394 – or better the Foreign Affairs Council –395 must adopt,
together with the European Council, the necessary ad hoc decisions,396 but the implementation of
the decisions in the field of common foreign policy will be reserved to the Council of Ministers,
which will decide on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the
European Council.397 The European Council and the Council of Ministers take decisions in the
field of the common foreign policy on proposal of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or of a
Member State,398 which may refer all questions concerning this area to the Council of
Ministers.399 The Council of Ministers will, on the one hand, take decisions by unanimity,400 but
abstentions will not prevent the adoption of a decision.401 A Member State may qualify its
abstention by making a formal declaration. In that case, the Member State is not obliged to
follow the decision, but it has to accept that the decision will commit the Union and it has to
refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision.
When the members of the Council of Ministers qualifying their abstention in the above
mentioned way represent at least one third of the Member States representing at least one third of
the population of the European Union, the decision will not be adopted.402
Instead of requiring one third of the weighted votes,403 the Draft Constitution requires one
third of the Member States representing at least one third of the population of the Union. On the
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other hand, the Council of Ministers will act by qualified majority, when adopting decisions on
Union actions and positions on the basis of a European decision of the European Council,
relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives.404 Also when adopting a decision on a
Union action or position, on a proposal that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs has put to it
following a specific request to him from the European Council made on its own initiative or that
of the Minister the Council of Ministers will act by qualified majority,405 when adopting any
European decision implementing a Union action or position,406 when adopting a decision
concerning the appointment of a special representative,407 or when the European Council decides
unanimously that the Council of Ministers will act by qualified majority for matters other than
the previously mentioned ones.408 But if a Member State declares that, for vital and stated
reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be adopted by
qualified majority, a vote will not be taken. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will, in close
consultation with the opposing Member State, search for an acceptable solution. If he does not
succeed, the Council of Ministers may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be
referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity,409 which means that a filtered
emergency brake has been introduced by the Draft Constitution. Decisions are still taken by
“quasi-unanimity”,410 as it was under the Single European Act, which was regretted by a number
of the members of the Convention.411 The only difference with the Treaty of Amsterdam is the
extra institutional filter: before bringing the matter before the European Council for decision by
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unanimity, the Union Minister may try to find a solution, which actually means that the Union
Minister has to reach unanimity on the issue presented to the Council of Ministers. The Council
in its new formation will remain responsible for the implementation of the common foreign
policy of the European Union set by the European Council.
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs – a new position created by the Draft
Constitution intended to combine the positions of the current High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner in charge of External Relations412 –
will put into effect and conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy, using national and
Union resources.413 The Minister will be appointed by the European Council, acting by qualified
majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission. His tenure will be ended by the
same procedure.414 He will be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, responsible for
handling external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action, for
which he will be bound by Commission procedures, but only when he exercises his
responsibilities within the European Commission.415 The Union Minister will not become a
separate institution because the Member States thought of a new institution as complicating the
general framework of the European Union.416
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will chair the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, as proposed by the current High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security

412

Antonio Missiroli, ESDP – Post-Iraq: Building a European Security and Defense Policy: What are the
priorities?, 2003 THE CICERO FOUNDATION, available at
http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/format_print.htm?article=missiroli_jun03&title=Lecture%20by%20Missir
oli (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
413
DRAFT CONST. art. I-39, cl. 4 juncto art. I-27, cl. 1.
414
Id. art. I-27, cl. 1.
415
Id. art. I-27, cl. 3.
416
Petite, supra note 310, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/98/98-2--III.AN.html#Heading21
(last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
48

Policy Javier Solana,417 and through his proposals he will contribute towards the preparation of a
Common Foreign and Security Policy. He will ensure implementation of decisions adopted by
the European Council and the Council of Ministers.418 For matters relating to the common
foreign policy, the Union Minister will represent the European Union. He will conduct political
dialogue on behalf of the Union and will express the Union’s position in international
conferences and organizations,419 so that the Union will have a speaker in international fora.420
The Minister will be assisted by a European External Action Service, which will work in
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States.421 In cases requiring rapid
decision, the Union Minister, on his own motion or at the request of a Member State, will
convene an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers within 48 hours, or in an
emergency, within a shorter time period.422
In international organizations and conferences Member States have to coordinate their
action, under the organization of the Union Minister, in order to uphold the Union’s position.423
Member States that are member of the United Nations Security Council have to keep the Union
Minister fully informed and when the European Union has defined a position which is on the
agenda of the Security Council, the Member States that sit on the Security Council will request
that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union’s position.424
Although the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs has to be the European face to the world, the
Council of Ministers can still appoint, on the initiative of the Minister, a special representative
417
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with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. Nonetheless, the special representative will
carry out his mandate under the authority of the Union Minister.425
Finally, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs – unlike the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy –426 will have ministerial status, because once the
European Union has defined a common approach, the Union Minister and the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of the Member States will coordinate their activities within the Council of
Ministers.427 Thus, in the European sphere, the Union Minister will be on the same level as the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the individual Member States. The Draft Constitution has also
given the Union Minister a strong mandate as the representative of the Union in the world.
Although there were ideas to make the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs subordinate to the
President of the European Council,428 there is no express mentioning of this in the Draft
Constitution. It is important that the President of the European Council cannot interfere with the
responsibilities of the Union Minister.429
Although there would still be a Presidency of the Council of Ministers, this will no longer
have any powers in the field of the common foreign policy because the Foreign Affairs Council
is presided by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.430 With the creation of the function of the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the so-called troika no longer has a place in the external
representation of the Union.431
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Under the Draft Constitution, the composition of the European Commission has changed
drastically and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will be the Vice-President of the European
Commission.432

The European Commission will ensure the external representation of the

European Union, with the exception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other cases
provided for in the Constitution.433 The new arrangements concerning the composition of the
European Commission will only take effect on November 1, 2009,434 which means that the
Union Minister will not become Vice-President of the European Commission before that date.435
The President of the Commission will have no powers in the field of foreign policy.436
The European Parliament has the right to be consulted on the main aspects and basic
choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who will ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration.
The Union Minister will also keep the Parliament regularly informed of the development of the
common foreign policy.437 The Working Group on External Action proposed this involvement
of the Union Minister in the consultation of the Parliament.438 Special representatives can be
involved in briefing the European Parliament.439

It may ask questions of the Council of

Ministers and of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or make recommendations to them.
Twice a year the Parliament will hold a debate on the progress in implementing the common
foreign policy.440 Basically, the European Council and the Council of Ministers will adopt
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decisions relating to the Union’s common foreign policy and the European Parliament will have
no other right than to be consulted and kept informed.441
The Court of Justice will have no jurisdiction with respect to the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.442 Nonetheless, the Court will have jurisdiction to monitor the compliance of
the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the areas of exclusive
competence,443 the areas of shared competence,444 the coordination of economic and employment
policies,445 and areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary action.446

But the

implementation of the policies mentioned in the previous areas may not affect the Union’s
competence in matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy;447 the Court of Justice will also
have jurisdiction to monitor this aspect.448 One group inside the Discussion Circle on the Court
of Justice favored judicial review on decisions in the field of foreign policy based on the rule of
law, while another group thought of this as weakening the Union’s effectiveness in its conduct of
foreign relations.449 Thus, no substantial changes in the jurisdiction of the Court will occur
under the Draft Constitution.
The Political and Security Committee will monitor the situation in the areas covered by
the common foreign policy and deliver opinions to the Council of Ministers at the request of the
latter, or of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, or on its own initiative. The Committee will
also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the
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Union Minister.450 The Political and Security Committee will exercise, under the responsibility
of the Council of Ministers and of the Union Minister, political control and strategic direction of
crisis management operations.451 The Council of Ministers may authorize the Committee, for the
purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council of
Ministers, to take the relevant measures concerning the political control and strategic direction of
the operation.452

b. Comparison of the Proposed System and Institutions of
the European Union for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs
The most important contribution of the Draft Constitution to the further development of a
common foreign policy is the creation of the function of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs who
will put the common foreign policy into effect. Unlike the High Representative, he will have
ministerial status. In his function as Vice-President of the Commission he will be responsible to
the Commission of which the Union Minister will be a part. The Union Minister can only be
dismissed by the European Council with the agreement of the President of the Commission.
Neither the Commission nor the European Council alone can end the tenure of the Union
Minister, in contrast with the President of the United States, who can dismiss the Secretary of
State – who has ministerial status – on his own authority. The Secretary of State is above all
responsible to the President and not to Congress, although the President must get approval from
the Senate for his appointment, the Secretary can be impeached, and he must testify before
Congress. The Union Minister will also not be responsible to the Council or the Parliament, but
only to the European Council, except in the case where he will act in his capacity as Vice450
451
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President of the Commission. The Commission, as a college, will be responsible to the European
Parliament,453 which means that the Union Minister will also have to resign when the European
Parliament has adopted a motion of censure. Thus the Union Minister will, as Vice-President of
the Commission, be responsible to the European Parliament, just as the Commissioner in charge
of External Relations is today.
The Draft Constitution also provides the creation of the function of President of the
European Council who will ensure, at his level and within his capacity, the external
representation of the Union, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Union Minister.
Although the President of the European Council cannot be compared with the heads of state and
government of the Member States or the President of the United States, his power will largely
depend of his personality. Especially in the field of foreign affairs, it is likely that the new
President of the European Council will want to position himself as the representative of the
European Union on the international forum.
Nonetheless, the current European confederation will have a President who will represent
the European Union; that representational function was missing in the United States under the
Articles of Confederation. The President of Congress did not act as the representative of the
American Confederation towards other countries and did not have any executive powers; he had
no other function than to preside the Congress of the Confederation.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
The same weaknesses that undermined the efficiency of the United States under the
Articles of Confederation appear today in the European Union.

The authority of the

Confederation to govern derived from the sovereignty of the states and not from the people, as
was apparent from the composition of Confederation Congress. This made the Confederation a
very feeble entity. In the field of foreign policy, the states retained their sovereignty, while the
Confederation had only very limited powers. Foreign policy was made by the states and in a
lesser degree by the Confederation.
In the European Union the Member States remain being the most important actors in the
foreign policy-making of Europe, although the instruments are available to establish a genuine
common foreign policy of the European Union. The sovereignty of the European Union in the
field of foreign policy also derives from constitutive entities, i.e. the Member States, and not
from the peoples comprising the Union. This is shown by the fact that the European Council, the
exponent of the intergovernmental cooperation, and the Council, which represents the Member
States, are the important institutions in the field of external relations. As long as the sovereignty
of the European Union in this area does not derive from the Member States and the European
people, the European Union will never be able to have a strong voice in its dealing with other
Nations and entities. In other words, to establish a real common foreign policy, more power for
the European Parliament is an absolute necessity. This has been accepted in Community matters
and should now be accepted in the Union’s common foreign policy.
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During the Convention on the future of the European Union the flaws in the current
institutional framework and the different options for change were not really discussed,454 what
raises questions about why so little time was allowed to discuss these important issues.455 Most
likely, the President of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, wanted to control
the institutional debate and to lobby for a strong President of the European Council.456 This
President of the European Council should be the answer on the “Kissinger Question”457, but
instead the Draft Constitution does not give a clear answer to this question, just as under the
present treaties. The external representation of the European Union remains divided between the
President of the European Council, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European
Commission.
Although the Union Minister, who will get ministerial status, would be the primary voice
and face of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, a strong President of the European
Council is able to place the Union Minister in a rather marginal role. The President of the
European Commission, Romano Prodi, has already expressed his concern about the lack of
democratic accountability with regards to the President of the European Council,458 who would
only be accountable to the European Council, while the President of the European Commission
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is politically accountable to the European Parliament.459

The European Parliament has

announced its skepticism towards a strong President of the European Council and warned that he
cannot encroach upon the external competences of the Commission and the Union Minister, who
will also be Vice-President of the Commission and qualitate qua accountable before the
European Parliament.460 Unlike in the United States, where the President represents the whole
Nation abroad, there will be no monolithic external representation of the European Union in the
world, although a lot will depend on the personal authority of this President of the European
Council.
Under the Draft Constitution the European Council, which cannot be compared to any
American institution, will remain the most important actor in the Union’s common foreign
policy, although the Council of Ministers will be responsible for the implementation of this
policy together with the Union Minister. The Commission, which has lost a lot of its prestige
and power since the end of the period of Jacques Delors,461 and a fortiori the European
Parliament play almost no role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the Council of
Ministers will have substantial powers. Unlike Congress, the European Parliament will have no
considerable powers in the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The President of the

European Council will probably become the face and voice of the European Union, just as the
President of the United States, but the people elect the latter, while the heads of state and
government will appoint the former. The President of the European Council will not have the
same powers of the President of the United States, which is rather an understatement. The
relationship with the President of the European Commission and the Union Minister, which,
459

See Federal Union, The European Council cannot lead Europe: The European Commission can, FEDERALIST
LETTER TO THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2003), available at
http://www.federalunion.org.uk/europe/fedletter/fl_7.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
460
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mutatis mutandis, will be comparable to the Secretary of State although the powers of the Union
Minister will be much more elaborate, is also not very clear. Because of the weakness of the
European Commission its President lost the fight for leadership in Europe and depending of the
personality of both the President of the European Council and the Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the former and latter can compete with the each other for primacy in the external
representation of the Union.
Under the Draft Constitution the power to decide on the conduct of foreign policy will
remain in the European Council, of which the position in the Union will be reinforced because of
the transformation from organ to institution of the European Union. The power to implement the
decisions on the conduct of foreign policy will be situated in the Council of Ministers and in the
new established function of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. If the Union Minister will have
a stronger role in the common foreign policy than the current High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy still needs to be seen in practice, but a lot will depend of
this personality and the relationship with the other actors in the Union’s external relations. The
European Parliament will not have the political power to control the conduct of foreign policy,
whilst the Court of Justice will have no judicial power to control the conduct of foreign policy,
although it will be able to monitor that the areas of exclusive competence, the areas of shared
competence, the coordination of economic and employment policies and areas of supporting,
coordinating or complementary action do not affect the Union’s competence in matters of
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The scope of this provision is currently not clear yet, but
it will be unlikely that the Court of Justice will take jurisdiction on issues that remain for the
most case intergovernmental.

461

Ulrike Guerot, Political Leadership for the European Union, EUROPEUM 2 (2002), available at
http://www.europeum.org/epin/06_Guerot_leadership.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
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A European federation to the example of the United States of America with a real
common foreign policy is still far from possible, and according to Jacques Delors, a living
European legend, such a federation will not be established before the year…2100.462

462

Bernard Bulcke, De schizofrenie van een Europese Fransman [The schizophrenia of a European Frenchman] ,
DE STANDAARD, Jan. 30, 2004, at 7.
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